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The Effect of Worrying on Intolerance of Uncertainty and Positive and Negative Beliefs 
about Worry 
 
Abstract 
Background and Objectives: The effect of a worry manipulation on the clinical constructs 
intolerance of uncertainty (IU), negative beliefs about the consequences of worry (NCOW), 
positive beliefs about the consequences of worry (PCOW), in addition to the emotions 
anxiety and sadness, was examined.  
Methods: A non-clinical sample was split into two groups, a worry group (n = 29), who were 
asked to generate 20 potential worries about a hypothetical scenario, and a control group (n 
= 28), who were asked to generate 2 potential worries about the same scenario. 
Subsequently, participants were asked to complete measures of IU, NCOW, PCOW, sadness 
and anxiety.  
Results: The worry group scored significantly higher than the control group on measures of 
IU, NCOW and PCOW but not on measures of sadness and anxiety.  
Limitations: Possible limitations of the current study include the use of a student sample and 
the use of a hypothetical worry scenario. 
Conclusions: The results suggest that engaging in worry can increase scores on measures of 
the beliefs and thought patterns often used to causally explain worry. The results are in line 
with recent research showing bidirectionality between anxiety related symptoms and their 
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associated clinical constructs, and are consistent with an approach which sees anxiety 
symptoms as part of an evolved integrated threat management system that alerts the 
individual to threats to goals or challenges, and coordinates cognitive, behavioral, and 
affective reactions to enable effective responding to these threats and challenges. 
Keywords: Worry; Generalised Anxiety Disorder; Metacognitive Beliefs; Intolerance of 
Uncertainty; Negative Mood.  
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1. Introduction 
Worry has been defined as a “chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect laden 
and relatively uncontrollable” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10). 
Excessive and uncontrollable worry is the central feature of Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) which affects around 2% of the population at 
any one time (Holaway, Rodebaugh, & Heimburg, 2006). More broadly, approximately two 
thirds of the population report one or more worries, with those who engage in worry 
reporting an average of 3 worry topics (Goncalves & Byrne, 2013), and taxometric studies 
suggest that normal and pathological worry are best conceptualised as occupying two points 
on a single continuum (e.g., Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001). “Interpersonal” worries are 
the most frequently reported worry topic and there is a moderate positive relationship 
between the reported number of worries and psychological distress (Goncalves & Byrne, 
2013).  
Over approximately the past 20 years, cognitive models of perseverative worry have 
attempted to develop constructs which capture the beliefs and thought patterns associated 
with worry. Two of the most conspicuous of these models are the intolerance of uncertainty 
(IU) model (Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004) and the 
metacognitive model (Wells, 1999). The aim of the present study was to examine if the 
process of worrying facilitates scores on prominent constructs found within these two 
models, constructs which are generally described within the literature as having a causal 
effect on worry.   
IU is defined as a “dispositional characteristic that arises from a set of negative 
beliefs about uncertainty and its connotations and consequences” (Birrell, Meares, 
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Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011, p.1200) and is underpinned by appraisals such as ‘uncertainty 
is dangerous’, ‘uncertainty is intolerable’ and ‘I can’t deal with uncertainty’ (Koerner & 
Dugas, 2006). The IU model (Dugas et al., 1997; Dugas et al., 2004) proposes that individuals 
high in IU find uncertain or ambiguous situations extremely distressing, and that this will 
trigger a ‘what if…?’ thinking style. The model also proposes that IU leads to a negative 
problem orientation and heightens cognitive avoidance, whereby worry functions as an 
affective dampening strategy driven by a difficulty in tolerating negative emotional states, 
both of which help to preserve worry. IU is therefore important in both creating a worry 
bout and maintaining it (Koerner & Dugas, 2006). 
The metacognitive model (Wells, 1999) draws a distinction between worries (type 1 
worry) and appraisals of worrying (type 2 worry). Additionally, the model also distinguishes 
between positive beliefs about the consequences of worry (PCOW, e.g., worrying clarifies 
my thoughts and concentration) and negative beliefs about the consequences of worry 
(NCOW, e.g., worrying makes me tense and irritable). Type 1 worry is triggered in response 
to anxiety provoking stimuli and this type of worry is linked to PCOW, such as believing that 
worrying will help the individual solve the problem. Type 2 worry occurs as a consequence 
of type 1 worry and is linked to NCOW, such as believing that worrying too much will make 
the individual ill. NCOW may trigger a number of mechanisms designed to gain control of a 
worry, such as thought suppression and avoidance, which paradoxically have the opposite 
effect (by, for example, increasing the salience of internal events). PCOW and NCOW, 
therefore, both have the potential to drive and maintain a worry bout. 
A number of studies have demonstrated that IU correlates with trait worry (e.g., 
Buhr & Dugas, 2006) as do both NCOW and PCOW (e.g., Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). 
Thielsch, Andor, and Ehring (2015), using Ecological Momentary Assessment in which worry 
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was assessed 7 times a day over a one week period, found that both IU and NCOW were 
significantly associated with worry, but that PCOW was not. IU has also been shown 
experimentally to have a causal effect on worry. Meeten, Dash, Scarlet, and Davey (2012) 
manipulated IU by having non-clinical participants imagine they were a character either high 
or low in IU when describing an event which had caused them uncertainty in their own lives. 
They found that the high IU group spent significantly longer engaging in a subsequent worry 
task than the low IU group. Prados (2011) induced positive beliefs about worry and negative 
beliefs about worry in separate groups. This was achieved using recorded messages 
intended to persuade participants that worry either has positive consequences or that 
worry has negative consequences. Prados (2011) found that neither the PCOW group or 
NCOW group differed from a control group in terms of subsequent worry. 
In contrast to the studies described above which investigate the relationship 
between constructs and worry or the effects of construct-relevant manipulations on worry, 
we here describe the results of a study designed to investigate the effects of worrying on 
measures of IU, NCOW and PCOW in a non-clinical population. The current study 
manipulated the degree to which participants were asked to engage in a worry task and 
examined the effect of this on measures of IU, NCOW and PCOW. There are several 
examples in the anxiety literature of bidirectionality between symptoms and their 
associated emotions, beliefs and thought patterns. For example, Davey, Meeten, Barnes, 
and Dash (2013) found that experimentally increasing aversive intrusive thoughts raised 
scores on inflated responsibility, IU and thought-action fusion, suggesting that symptoms 
can have a direct causal impact on measures of the constructs that are often used to explain 
them. Similarly, experimentally manipulating negative mood increases scores on measures 
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of IU and inflated responsibility, whilst manipulating IU or inflated responsibility increases 
negative mood (Britton & Davey, 2014). With respect to worry - anxiety, fear and negative 
mood increase the tendency to worry (Buhr & Dugas, 2009; Johnston & Davey, 1997) but 
experimentally inducing worry also raises scores on measures of anxiety (McLaughlin, 
Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007).  
The IU model (Dugas et al., 1997; Dugas et al., 2004) and the metacognitive model 
(Wells, 1999) provide explanations as to how IU, NCOW and PCOW, respectively, might act 
as both initiating and maintenance factors in worry, with varying degrees of empirical 
support in relation to each construct. There is some evidence to suggest that engaging in 
worry might increase scores on some of the constructs measured in the current study. In 
relation to IU, a longitudinal study in adolescents found a bidirectional and reciprocal 
relationship between IU and worrying, with each explaining unique variance in the 
development of the other across a five year period (Dugas, Laugesen, & Bukowski, 2012). In 
relation to beliefs about worry, Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) suggest that the 
experience of repeatedly worrying may lead to a diminished sense of control over time and 
that this may automatically initiate negative beliefs about worry. 
To the authors’ knowledge the current study is the first to examine whether 
worrying influences constructs which are usually used to explain worry. The study has the 
potential to inform both the IU model and the metacognitive model by, for example, 
providing the first empirical examination of whether worrying facilitates scores on measures 
of NCOW, as hypothesised by Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997). More broadly, the study 
explores whether recent findings within the anxiety literature which demonstrate 
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bidirectionality between symptoms and the constructs which are usually used to causally 
explain those symptoms, potentially extends to worry and worry related constructs.  
In addition to the constructs discussed above negative mood was also measured in 
order to potentially examine the role of negative affect as a potential mediator in any 
relationships found between the worry and the constructs previously discussed. Evidence 
suggests that negative mood has a bidirectional relationship with both worry (Buhr & Dugas, 
2009; Johnston & Davey, 1997; McLaughlin et al., 2007) and IU (Britton & Davey, 2014) and 
negative mood is associated with both PCOW and NCOW (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997).  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
All participants were volunteers who were recruited via online social media and via 
the University of Derby research participation scheme. This research participation scheme is 
open to psychology undergraduates at the University of Derby and provides undergraduates 
with research participation credit which can be used towards partial fulfilment of a course 
requirement. There were a total of 57 participants (female = 46, male = 11). Ages ranged 
from 18 to 68 (M = 35.21, SD = 13.87).  
Ethical approval for the current study was obtained from University of Derby. All 
procedures were performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the British 
Psychological Society and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments. 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 Pre-manipulation Measures 
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Pre-manipulation worry levels were measured using the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), a 16-item questionnaire 
developed to assess the frequency and intensity of worry. The internal consistency of the 
PSWQ in the current sample was excellent (α = .93). 
2.2.2 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) measures 
Because validated measures of IU, NCOW and PCOW may not be sensitive enough to 
register changes resulting from proximal experimental manipulations, a smaller selection of 
items were selected from the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale – Short Form (IUS-12; 
Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007) and the Consequences of Worry Scale (COWS; 
Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) to measure IU, NCOW and PCOW respectively. Each item 
was converted into a 100-point VAS scale where participants were asked to rate the extent 
with which they agreed at that moment in time with each statement (where 0 = Do not 
agree and 100 = Very much agree). Each item related to IU, NCOW and PCOW, respectively, 
were then summed to create a composite VAS score for each construct. The reason for 
using VAS measures of the relevant constructs, in addition to the full measures, is threefold. 
Firstly, studies have suggested that VAS scales are both more sensitive and reliable in 
detecting small and immediate changes in status in comparison to Likert scales (e.g., Grant 
et al., 1999; Reips & Funke, 2008). All of the full measures used in the current study 
incorporate Likert scales. Secondly, the use of a smaller selection of items means that 
participants are asked to produce a score on each construct in a relatively short period of 
time in comparison to if they had been asked to immediately complete each full construct 
measure after the worry manipulation. Such an approach is consistent with other studies 
which aim to measure the effect of experimental manipulations on clinical constructs (e.g., 
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Britton & Davey, 2014) and it is hoped the reduced time required to collect scores on each 
construct will result in the VAS measures being more sensitive in detecting any immediate 
effect of the worry manipulation on these constructs (Britton & Davey, 2014). Finally, the 
VAS measure questions were worded to ask the participant to respond in relation to how 
they feel at that moment in time as opposed to the full construct measures which ask 
participants to provide answers in relation to how they feel more generally.  These VAS 
measures were administered directly after the experimental manipulation. Full scale 
measures were administered immediately after the VAS measures. The validity of the VAS 
measures was assessed by analysing correlations between the composite VAS score and the 
score on the respective full measure. 
IU was measured using 4 items selected from the IUS-12 (Carleton et al., 2007). 
Carleton et al. (2007) suggest that two factors underlie the IUS -12: prospective anxiety and 
inhibitory anxiety. Two of the items chosen to measure IU in the current study were those 
items which loaded most highly onto the prospective anxiety subscale in Carleton et al. 
(2007), and the third and fourth items are those which loaded most highly onto the 
inhibitory anxiety subscale in the same paper. These items were, “Unforeseen events upset 
me greatly”, “I can’t stand being taken by surprise”, “When I am uncertain I can’t function 
very well” and “When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses me”. The internal consistency of 
these 4 items in the current sample was good (α = .82). 
NCOW was measured using 3 items from the COWS (Davey et al., 1996). Davey et al. 
(1996) suggest that three factors underlie NCOW: worry disrupts effective performance, 
worry exaggerates the problem and worrying causes emotional discomfort. The three items 
chosen to measure NCOW were the three items which loaded most highly onto these 3 
10 
 
factors respectively in Davey et al. (1996). These items were, “Worrying increases my 
anxiety and so decreases my performance”, “I become paranoid when I worry” and “Worry 
causes me stress”. The internal consistency of these 3 items in the current sample was 
acceptable (α = .74). 
PCOW was measured using 2 items from the COWS (Davey et al., 1996). Davey et al. 
(1996) suggest that two factors underlie PCOW: worry motivates and worry helps analytic 
thinking. The two items chosen to measure PCOW were the two items which loaded most 
highly onto these 2 factors respectively in Davey et al. (1996). These items were, “Worrying 
challenges and motivates me, without them I would not achieve much in life” and 
“Worrying makes me reflect on life by asking questions I might not usually ask when happy”. 
The internal consistency of these 2 items in the current sample was mediocre (α = .63). 
In addition to the above, negative mood was measured using two items with VAS 
scales. Participants were asked to rate their current level of sadness and anxiety on separate 
100 point VAS scales (where 0 = not at all sad/anxious and 100 = extremely sad/anxious).   
2.2.3 Full scale measures 
IU was measured using the IUS-12 (Carleton et al., 2007). The internal consistency of 
the IUS-12 in the current sample was excellent (α = .94). NCOW were measured using the 
COWS (Davey et al., 1996). The internal consistency of the NCOW subscale in the current 
sample was excellent (α = .97). PCOW were also measured using the COWS (Davey et al., 
1996). The internal consistency of the PCOW subscale in the current sample was excellent (α 
= .95). 
2.3 Procedure 
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Once participants had indicated they wished to take part in the study they were 
emailed a link which led to an information sheet and subsequently to the informed consent 
form. The experimental manipulation and all measures were administered via the online 
data collection tool Qualtrics.  
Stage 1: Informed consent and questionnaire completion. Participants were given an 
information sheet briefly outlining the experimental procedure. In this information sheet 
participants were asked to remain at their computer or other device throughout the 
duration of the study and were informed the study would take approximately 25-40 minutes 
to complete. Participants were also asked to ensure they completed the study at a time and 
location where they would not be distracted. Participants then completed an informed 
consent form and provided some basic demographic details before completing the PSWQ.  
Stage 2: Worry manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to a worry group 
(n = 29, male n = 5) or a control group (n = 28, male n = 6) at this stage by the random 
assignment feature in Qualtrics. Participants in both groups were presented with the 
following scenario and were asked to imagine that they were the person in the scenario and 
that the situation had just happened to them: 
It’s a Monday morning and you are on your way to work. When walking to the bus 
stop you pick up a newspaper at the newsagents to read on your bus journey to work. You 
take out your wallet/purse and pay for your newspaper before walking to the bus stop. As 
the bus arrives you get out the correct change for your bus ticket from your pocket, having 
counted this out before you left the house to avoid having to get out your wallet/purse at the 
bus stop. You know you have a particularly big day ahead of you at work and so when you 
get off the bus you decide to buy yourself a fresh coffee in the coffee shop which the bus 
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stops directly in front of. You order your coffee and upon paying you realise that you no 
longer have your wallet/purse. You retrace your steps of that morning in your head in an 
attempt to understand what might have happened. You know that you took your 
wallet/purse with you when you left your house as you paid for your newspaper. However, it 
is clear that somewhere between paying for your newspaper and ordering your coffee you 
lost possession of your wallet/purse.     
After reading the scenario participants were asked to provide reasons (or ‘worry 
incidents’) regarding why this situation would worry them (e.g., one possible example of a 
worry incident would be “I worry that my mother would be upset with me as she bought me 
the wallet/purse for my birthday”). Participants were asked to write each worry incident in 
short sentence format in spaces provided. Participants in the control group were asked to 
provide only two worry incidents before moving onto stage 3 of the experiment. 
Participants in the worry group, in contrast, were asked to provide twenty worry incidents 
before moving onto stage 3. Qualtrics was set up so that participants in both groups could 
only move onto stage 3 of the experiment once they had provided the requested number of 
worry incidents.  
Stage 3: VAS measures. All participants completed the VAS measures of IU, NCOW, 
PCOW and negative mood outlined in the measures section. 
Stage 4: Full scale measures. All participants completed the IUS-12 and COWS. 
Stage 5: Debrief. Participants were presented with the debriefing sheet and thanked 
for their participation. 
3. Results  
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Comparisons between groups were made using independent samples t-tests where 
parametric test assumptions were met. Where parametric test assumptions were not met, 
comparisons between groups were made using the Mann–Whitney U test. In order for an 
effect on one of the dependent constructs to be considered significant two criteria must be 
reached. Firstly, the VAS measure of the construct must significantly positively correlate 
with the full measure of that construct. For correlations, Pearson's r is reported unless 
parametric assumptions were not met, in which case Spearman’s rs is reported. Secondly, 
the difference between the two groups on the VAS measure of that construct must reach 
the level of p < .05 (two-tailed). Note that the first of these criteria were not applied to 
baseline worry levels and to negative mood which were measured at only one time point.  
Unless otherwise stated, all means reported refer to the mean score at item level 
within the relevant composite measure, sub-scale measure or full questionnaire measure 
being reported.  
3.1 Pre-manipulation worry levels 
Prior to the experimental manipulation, the worry group and control group did not 
differ significantly in terms of PSWQ score. This suggests that the two groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of their worry levels prior to the manipulation.  
Females (M = 3.57, SD = .82) scored significantly higher on the PSWQ than males (M 
= 2.88, SD = .78), t(55) = 2.52, p < .05, d = 0.86, a finding consistent with other studies 
utilising undergraduate samples (e.g., Meyer et al., 1990). Age and PSWQ total score were 
negatively correlated but this correlation was not significant, r(57) = -.15, p = .28. The mean 
total score (that is the total score on the full PSWQ) for the whole sample in the current 
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study (M = 54.97, SD = 13.61) is slightly higher but comparable to that reported by Meyer et 
al. (1990) in the studies in which they utilised undergraduate samples (study 2: M = 48.80, 
SD = 13.80; study 4: M = 46.70, SD = 14.01). 
3.2 Negative mood 
The control group and worry group did not differ significantly in terms of sadness or 
anxiety scores. As the groups did not differ significantly in terms of negative mood, neither 
sadness or anxiety were explored as potential mediators in any of the analyses which follow. 
3.3 IU   
A composite IU score was created by combining the means of the four VAS IU 
questions. The composite IU score was significantly correlated with the score on the IUS-12, 
r(57) = .82, p < .001, suggesting that the VAS measure possessed convergent validity with 
the full measure. The worry group (M = 57.30, SD = 24.80) scored significantly higher on the 
composite IU measure than the control group (M = 43.72, SD = 19.22), t(55) = 2.31, p < .05, 
d = 0.62. On the IUS-12, the worry group (M = 2.88, SD = 1.15) scored higher than the 
control group (M = 2.47, SD = .76) but this difference was not significant, t(55) = 1.46, p = 
.15, d = 0.39.  
3.4 Negative consequences of worry 
A composite NCOW score was created by combining the means of the three VAS 
NCOW questions. The composite NCOW score was significantly correlated with the NCOW 
subscale of the COWS, rs(57) = .72, p < .001, suggesting that the VAS measure possessed 
convergent validity with the full measure. The worry group (M = 66.92, SD = 22.23) scored 
significantly higher on the composite NCOW measure than the control group (M = 52.64, SD 
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= 22.15), t(55) = 2.43, p < .05, d = 0.66. On the NCOW subscale of the COWS, the worry 
group (M = 2.91, SD = 1.09) scored higher than the control group (M = 2.57, SD = .96) but 
this difference was not significant, U(55) = 329, p = .22, d = 0.35.  
3.5 Positive consequences of worry 
A composite PCOW score was created by combining the means of the two VAS 
PCOW questions. The composite PCOW score was significantly correlated with the PCOW 
subscale of the COWS, r(57) = .57, p < .001, suggesting that the VAS measure possessed 
convergent validity with the full measure. The worry group (M = 53.79, SD = 26.67) scored 
significantly higher on the composite PCOW measure than the control group (M = 40.45, SD 
= 20.07), t(55) = 2.13, p < .05, d = 0.57. On the PCOW subscale of the COWS, the worry 
group (M = 2.52, SD = 1.14) scored higher than the control group (M = 2.22, SD = .92) but 
this difference was not significant, t(55) = 1.07, p = .29, d = 0.29.  
3.6 Correlations between dependent variables   
The correlation between the VAS composite measures of the three dependent 
variables (IU, NCOW and PCOW) was examined. IU was significantly positively correlated 
with NCOW, rs(57) = .60, p < .001, and PCOW, r(57) = .39, p < .01. NCOW and PCOW were 
positively correlated but this correlation was not significant, rs(57) = .13, p = .34.  
4. Discussion 
The experiment described in this paper indicates that engaging in worry increases 
scores on worry relevant construct measures, specifically IU, NCOW and PCOW. These 
constructs have been hypothesised to be central in both driving and maintaining worry 
(Koerner & Dugas, 2006; Wells, 1999) and the results of the present study add to this 
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literature by indicating that such beliefs and thought patterns are processes that also 
emerge directly from engaging in worry. 
Previous research has suggested that IU has a direct causal effect on worry (Meeten 
et al., 2012) which, when considered alongside the results of the current study, suggests a 
bidirectional relationship between IU and worry, consistent with the relationship pattern 
indicated by Dugas et al’s. (2012) longitudinal study. Ruggiero et al. (2012) found that the 
effect of IU on worry was mediated by NCOW. If this is the case it would suggest that 
manipulating IU should lead to an increase in scores on NCOW. Future research may wish to 
examine this potential pathway.  
The finding that worry has a causal influence on both NCOW and PCOW is consistent 
with the suggestion that frequent engagement in worry effects beliefs about worry 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). Whilst the findings of the present study, when 
considered in conjunction with the metacognitive model (Wells, 1999), suggest a 
bidirectional relationship between worry and NCOW and PCOW respectively, to the authors’ 
knowledge there is no published experimental evidence showing a direct causal effect of 
NCOW or PCOW on worry. Indeed, Prados (2011) manipulated both NCOW and PCOW and 
found that neither affected subsequent worry. Future research may wish to further explore 
if the relationship between worry and NCOW and PCOW, respectively, is unidirectional, 
where increasing worry increases subsequent positive and negative beliefs about worry, or 
if the relationship is bidirectional as would be suggested by the metacognitive model 
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997).  
Interestingly a causal effect of worry on negative mood was not found, which 
contradicts past research in this area (e.g., McLaughlin et al., 2007). The authors would 
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speculate that this finding may be due to the fact the worry task employed in the current 
study was one which required participants to worry about a hypothetical situation and not a 
situation related to the participant’s own experience or life situation. It may be the case that 
in order for engaging in worry to increase negative mood, the worry topic must be a topic 
personal to one’s own experience or life situation. Given that negative mood did not appear 
to mediate the relationship between worry and the constructs focused on in the current 
study, future research may wish to explore what other mediators may underlie these 
relationships. One possible mediator is a systematic information processing style, which has 
previously been shown to mediate the causal effect of negative mood on worry (Dash & 
Davey, 2012). Systematic information processing style has been described as an “analytic 
orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinise all informational input for its relevance 
and importance, and integrate all useful information in forming their judgements” (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989, p. 212). In reference to the current study, one can imagine how 
the process of being asked to generate a large number of worries about a hypothetical 
situation could have led to participants in the worry group adopting a systematic 
information processing style.  
More broadly, the findings of the current study are in line with a recent body of 
research showing bidirectionality between anxiety related symptoms and their associated 
emotions, beliefs and thought patterns (e.g., Davey et al., 2013; Britton & Davey, 2014). The 
findings of the current study are also consistent with a motivational symptoms approach to 
understanding anxiety related symptoms (Britton & Davey, 2014). This approach considers 
clinically relevant symptoms such as worry as part of an evolved integrated threat 
management system that alerts the individual to threats to goals or challenges, and 
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coordinates cognitive, behavioral, and affective reactions to enable the individual to 
respond more effectively to these threats and challenges. Rather than one set of factors 
(e.g., constructs) being causes of a different set of factors (e.g., symptoms), they are all 
integrated components of an anxiety precautionary system that promotes a “cascade” of 
relevant perceptions, cognitions, behaviours, and affective experience conducive to solving 
the adaptive problem (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010).  
When considering the implications of the present findings for clinical practice, the 
effect of worry on worry-related beliefs and thought patterns implies that addressing these 
beliefs and thought patterns in clinical treatments may not be a necessary condition for 
recovery. If such beliefs and thought patterns are triggered by the process of worry itself, 
then direct targeting of worry may be sufficient to reduce anxiety symptoms. Whilst 
interventions for GAD based around targeting IU (e.g., Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000) and 
metacognitive beliefs (e.g., Wells & King, 2006), respectively, have been shown to be 
effective treatments, this maybe due to more generalised elements of the treatments rather 
than because the treatments specifically target the relevant construct or constructs. This 
may especially be the case with interventions which target metacognitive beliefs, given 
there is no causal evidence of an effect of NCOW or PCOW on worry, with Prados (2011) 
failing to find that manipulating either construct effected subsequent worry levels. The 
metacognitive model implicates other elements in the causes of worry which are addressed 
in therapy, such as reassurance seeking and thought suppression (Wells & King, 2006). 
There are a number of limitations associated with the current study worth 
commenting upon. Firstly, as outlined earlier in the discussion, a possible mediating variable 
in the effect of worry on clinical constructs is systematic processing (Dash & Davey, 2012). 
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As the current study can be seen as exploratory in terms of examining the effects of worry 
on clinical constructs, a group who were asked to produce a relatively large number of 
worries about a hypothetical situation (worry group) were compared to a group who were 
asked to produce a comparatively small number of worries about the same hypothetical 
situation (control group). A consequence of this is that the worry group are likely to have 
been more cognitively engaged in the manipulation task than the control group. It may be 
the case that this difference in cognitive engagement between the worry group and control 
group may have directly elicited a systematic processing style in the worry group compared 
to the control group, and that it is this engagement in systematic processing (as opposed to 
actually worrying) which led to increases in scores on the relevant constructs in the worry 
group compared to the control group. This possibility is supported by the fact that worrying 
and systematic information processing share similar functional brain characteristics in the 
left frontal lobes (Leynes, 2002; Leynes & Phillips, 2008) and systematic processing and 
worry are influenced by similar psychological cognitive states and appraisals (Dash, Meeten, 
& Davey, 2013). Future research may wish to examine if having participants engage in 
worry, as opposed to another neutral, equally cognitively engaging task, increases scores on 
the relevant constructs. This would increase confidence that it is actual engagement in 
worry, rather than engaging in systematic processing more generally, which increases scores 
on the relevant variables. Having participants in a control group engage in a neutral task 
(e.g., the naming of incidents from some category, such as animals) rather than engaging in 
worrying would also provide a starker contrast between the worry and control groups in 
terms of the respective tasks they are asked to perform. Another possible confounding 
factor which may have affected the results of the current study is that as participants in the 
control group were asked to produce only two worries whilst participants in the worry 
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group were asked to produce twenty, it is likely that those in worry group would have spent 
significantly longer engaging in the manipulation than those in the control group. It maybe 
that differences between the groups on the subsequent measures of the clinical constructs 
may have been an artefact of this difference in terms of time engaged in the manipulation. 
This possibility would also be addressed by having a control group engage in a neutral, 
equally cognitively engaging task. 
Secondly, whilst pre-manipulation worry levels were measured showing that the 
worry group and control group did not differ significantly in terms of pre-manipulation 
worry levels, worry was not measured post-manipulation. It is therefore not possible to 
compare worry levels between the two groups post-manipulation. Future studies which aim 
to experimentally manipulate worry should consider measuring worry levels post-
manipulation so that possible group differences can be explored. 
Thirdly, a potential limitation of the current study is that participant’s responses may 
have been affected by demand characteristics. Specifically, as the manipulation involved a 
worry task, this may have effected responses on the subsequent measures of IU, PCOW and 
NCOW. This is especially the case for the PCOW and NCOW measures, which explicitly refer 
to worrying. Whilst it would be difficult to manipulate worry experimentally without 
introducing the potential for demand characteristics, employing a filler task between the 
manipulation and the subsequent measurement of the clinical constructs may have reduced 
this potential. 
Fourthly, given that the worry manipulation in the current study involved a situation 
which was hypothetical in nature, it could be argued that the worry manipulation lacks 
ecological validity. Whilst some studies have manipulated worry by having participants 
select their own topic of worry (e.g., Borkovec & Inz, 1990) the authors felt, given the 
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potentially diverse nature of topics that participants might chose to worry about and the 
possible variation in subsequent intensity of worry as a result of such diversity, that it would 
be difficult to control how much participants would actually engage in the process of 
worrying using such a method. Further, a series of studies by Davey and Levy (1998) showed 
that individuals tend to worry about hypothetical worries they have never encountered 
before. This was demonstrated across a range of participants ranging from non-worriers to 
chronic high worriers with PSWQ scores indicative of a diagnosis of GAD, supporting the use 
of hypothetical worry scenarios in experimental studies examining worry related 
phenomena. Nevertheless, future research may wish to examine if the effect of worry on 
the constructs measured in the current study would be replicated with a worry 
manipulation which asks participants to worry about a topic of their own choosing. As 
mentioned above, it may be the case that in order for worry to affect negative mood, the 
content of the worry topic needs to be personal, rather than hypothetical, in nature.  
Fifthly, although participants were asked to ensure they completed the study in one 
sitting in a location/at a time where they would not be disturbed, given that the study was 
delivered online, we cannot be sure that all participants complied with this request. Future 
research may wish to replicate the current study in a controlled, laboratory environment.  
Sixthly, the current study utilised a non-clinical sample. As mentioned in the 
introduction, approximately two thirds of the population report one or more worries 
(Goncalves & Byrne, 2013) and taxometric studies suggest that normal and pathological 
worry are best conceptualised as occupying two points on a single continuum (e.g., Ruscio 
et al., 2001) supporting the use of non-clinical samples in investigating worry related 
phenomena. Moreover, many studies have made use of non-clinical samples when 
investigating the potential causes of worry (e.g., Meeten et al., 2012; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & 
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Dugas, 2000). Nevertheless, the results of the current study would be strengthened if they 
were replicated in a clinical sample. 
Seventh, Cohen (1992) suggests that in order to detect a medium difference (d = .50) 
between two independent sample means at an unadjusted significance level of p < .05 a 
sample size of n = 128 is required. The current study (n = 57) is therefore underpowered for 
detecting a medium difference at an unadjusted significance level of p < .05. Low power also 
reduces the likelihood that a statistically significant result reflects a true effect. 
Consequences of this include overestimates of effect size and low reproducibility of results 
(Button et al., 2013). 
Finally, it should be noted that the current study examined the effect of a brief 
manipulation, which targeted state worry, on the relevant measured constructs. The study 
therefore does not directly inform us about the possible effects of chronic worry on the 
relevant measured constructs. Relatedly, a fairly recent distinction has been made between 
state and trait IU (Shihata, McEvoy, Mullan, & Carleton, 2016). It should be noted that the 
effect of the manipulation in the current study on IU is likely to have been on state IU as 
opposed to trait IU. The extent to which state IU and trait IU co-occur is not known and 
future research is needed to determine if state expressions of IU and trait expressions of IU 
differ in their relationships with psychopathology (Shihata et al., 2016). 
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